diff --git a/awx/api/filters.py b/awx/api/filters.py
index 2bfa60a5ef..d7b6c5dd0b 100644
--- a/awx/api/filters.py
+++ b/awx/api/filters.py
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ class FieldLookupBackend(BaseFilterBackend):
 
     # A list of fields that we know can be filtered on without the possiblity
     # of introducing duplicates
-    NO_DUPLICATES_WHITELIST = (CharField, IntegerField, BooleanField)
+    NO_DUPLICATES_ALLOW_LIST = (CharField, IntegerField, BooleanField)
 
     def get_fields_from_lookup(self, model, lookup):
 
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ class FieldLookupBackend(BaseFilterBackend):
         field_list, new_lookup = self.get_fields_from_lookup(model, lookup)
         field = field_list[-1]
 
-        needs_distinct = (not all(isinstance(f, self.NO_DUPLICATES_WHITELIST) for f in field_list))
+        needs_distinct = (not all(isinstance(f, self.NO_DUPLICATES_ALLOW_LIST) for f in field_list))
 
         # Type names are stored without underscores internally, but are presented and
         # and serialized over the API containing underscores so we remove `_`
diff --git a/awx/api/generics.py b/awx/api/generics.py
index 2fcf1b3edb..c7e68bfc49 100644
--- a/awx/api/generics.py
+++ b/awx/api/generics.py
@@ -159,11 +159,11 @@ class APIView(views.APIView):
             self.queries_before = len(connection.queries)
 
         # If there are any custom headers in REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS, make sure
-        # they respect the proxy whitelist
+        # they respect the allowed proxy list
         if all([
-            settings.PROXY_IP_WHITELIST,
-            request.environ.get('REMOTE_ADDR') not in settings.PROXY_IP_WHITELIST,
-            request.environ.get('REMOTE_HOST') not in settings.PROXY_IP_WHITELIST
+            settings.PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST,
+            request.environ.get('REMOTE_ADDR') not in settings.PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST,
+            request.environ.get('REMOTE_HOST') not in settings.PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST
         ]):
             for custom_header in settings.REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS:
                 if custom_header.startswith('HTTP_'):
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ class CopyAPIView(GenericAPIView):
 
     @staticmethod
     def _decrypt_model_field_if_needed(obj, field_name, field_val):
-        if field_name in getattr(type(obj), 'REENCRYPTION_BLACKLIST_AT_COPY', []):
+        if field_name in getattr(type(obj), 'REENCRYPTION_BLOCKLIST_AT_COPY', []):
             return field_val
         if isinstance(obj, Credential) and field_name == 'inputs':
             for secret in obj.credential_type.secret_fields:
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ class CopyAPIView(GenericAPIView):
                 field_val = getattr(obj, field.name)
             except AttributeError:
                 continue
-            # Adjust copy blacklist fields here.
+            # Adjust copy blocked fields here.
             if field.name in fields_to_discard or field.name in [
                 'id', 'pk', 'polymorphic_ctype', 'unifiedjobtemplate_ptr', 'created_by', 'modified_by'
             ] or field.name.endswith('_role'):
diff --git a/awx/api/serializers.py b/awx/api/serializers.py
index 9f99cd8ab4..74aca585f1 100644
--- a/awx/api/serializers.py
+++ b/awx/api/serializers.py
@@ -1936,7 +1936,7 @@ class InventorySourceOptionsSerializer(BaseSerializer):
     def validate_source_vars(self, value):
         ret = vars_validate_or_raise(value)
         for env_k in parse_yaml_or_json(value):
-            if env_k in settings.INV_ENV_VARIABLE_BLACKLIST:
+            if env_k in settings.INV_ENV_VARIABLE_BLOCKED:
                 raise serializers.ValidationError(_("`{}` is a prohibited environment variable".format(env_k)))
         return ret
 
diff --git a/awx/conf/migrations/0007_v380_rename_more_settings.py b/awx/conf/migrations/0007_v380_rename_more_settings.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a57b7ec4bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/awx/conf/migrations/0007_v380_rename_more_settings.py
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+from __future__ import unicode_literals
+from django.db import migrations
+from awx.conf.migrations import _rename_setting
+
+
+def copy_allowed_ips(apps, schema_editor):
+    _rename_setting.rename_setting(apps, schema_editor, old_key='PROXY_IP_WHITELIST', new_key='PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST')
+
+
+class Migration(migrations.Migration):
+
+    dependencies = [
+        ('conf', '0006_v331_ldap_group_type'),
+    ]
+
+    operations = [
+        migrations.RunPython(copy_allowed_ips),
+    ]
diff --git a/awx/main/access.py b/awx/main/access.py
index 4705fb2cfc..72f25bc914 100644
--- a/awx/main/access.py
+++ b/awx/main/access.py
@@ -1513,8 +1513,7 @@ class JobTemplateAccess(NotificationAttachMixin, BaseAccess):
         thus can be made by a job template administrator which may not have access
         to the any inventory, project, or credentials associated with the template.
         '''
-        # We are white listing fields that can
-        field_whitelist = [
+        allowed_fields = [
             'name', 'description', 'forks', 'limit', 'verbosity', 'extra_vars',
             'job_tags', 'force_handlers', 'skip_tags', 'ask_variables_on_launch',
             'ask_tags_on_launch', 'ask_job_type_on_launch', 'ask_skip_tags_on_launch',
@@ -1529,7 +1528,7 @@ class JobTemplateAccess(NotificationAttachMixin, BaseAccess):
             if k not in [x.name for x in obj._meta.concrete_fields]:
                 continue
             if hasattr(obj, k) and getattr(obj, k) != v:
-                if k not in field_whitelist and v != getattr(obj, '%s_id' % k, None) \
+                if k not in allowed_fields and v != getattr(obj, '%s_id' % k, None) \
                         and not (hasattr(obj, '%s_id' % k) and getattr(obj, '%s_id' % k) is None and v == ''): # Equate '' to None in the case of foreign keys
                     return False
         return True
diff --git a/awx/main/conf.py b/awx/main/conf.py
index dcc40c0528..5517a438f6 100644
--- a/awx/main/conf.py
+++ b/awx/main/conf.py
@@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ register(
 )
 
 register(
-    'PROXY_IP_WHITELIST',
+    'PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST',
     field_class=fields.StringListField,
-    label=_('Proxy IP Whitelist'),
+    label=_('Proxy IP Allowed List'),
     help_text=_("If Tower is behind a reverse proxy/load balancer, use this setting "
-                "to whitelist the proxy IP addresses from which Tower should trust "
+                "to configure the proxy IP addresses from which Tower should trust "
                 "custom REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS header values. "
                 "If this setting is an empty list (the default), the headers specified by "
                 "REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS will be trusted unconditionally')"),
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ register(
     field_class=fields.StringListField,
     required=False,
     label=_('Paths to expose to isolated jobs'),
-    help_text=_('Whitelist of paths that would otherwise be hidden to expose to isolated jobs. Enter one path per line.'),
+    help_text=_('List of paths that would otherwise be hidden to expose to isolated jobs. Enter one path per line.'),
     category=_('Jobs'),
     category_slug='jobs',
 )
diff --git a/awx/main/constants.py b/awx/main/constants.py
index 989abb8858..c0382c7504 100644
--- a/awx/main/constants.py
+++ b/awx/main/constants.py
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ STANDARD_INVENTORY_UPDATE_ENV = {
 CAN_CANCEL = ('new', 'pending', 'waiting', 'running')
 ACTIVE_STATES = CAN_CANCEL
 CENSOR_VALUE = '************'
-ENV_BLACKLIST = frozenset((
+ENV_BLOCKLIST = frozenset((
     'VIRTUAL_ENV', 'PATH', 'PYTHONPATH', 'PROOT_TMP_DIR', 'JOB_ID',
     'INVENTORY_ID', 'INVENTORY_SOURCE_ID', 'INVENTORY_UPDATE_ID',
     'AD_HOC_COMMAND_ID', 'REST_API_URL', 'REST_API_TOKEN', 'MAX_EVENT_RES',
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ ENV_BLACKLIST = frozenset((
 ))
 
 # loggers that may be called in process of emitting a log
-LOGGER_BLACKLIST = (
+LOGGER_BLOCKLIST = (
     'awx.main.utils.handlers',
     'awx.main.utils.formatters',
     'awx.main.utils.filters',
diff --git a/awx/main/fields.py b/awx/main/fields.py
index 4e854bbb8b..e4ec5ede2b 100644
--- a/awx/main/fields.py
+++ b/awx/main/fields.py
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ from awx.main.models.rbac import (
     batch_role_ancestor_rebuilding, Role,
     ROLE_SINGLETON_SYSTEM_ADMINISTRATOR, ROLE_SINGLETON_SYSTEM_AUDITOR
 )
-from awx.main.constants import ENV_BLACKLIST
+from awx.main.constants import ENV_BLOCKLIST
 from awx.main import utils
 
 
@@ -870,9 +870,9 @@ class CredentialTypeInjectorField(JSONSchemaField):
                   'use is not allowed in credentials.').format(env_var),
                 code='invalid', params={'value': env_var},
             )
-        if env_var in ENV_BLACKLIST:
+        if env_var in ENV_BLOCKLIST:
             raise django_exceptions.ValidationError(
-                _('Environment variable {} is blacklisted from use in credentials.').format(env_var),
+                _('Environment variable {} is not allowed to be used in credentials.').format(env_var),
                 code='invalid', params={'value': env_var},
             )
 
diff --git a/awx/main/models/base.py b/awx/main/models/base.py
index 446b29e1b6..8fb8e2d782 100644
--- a/awx/main/models/base.py
+++ b/awx/main/models/base.py
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ def prevent_search(relation):
         sensitive_data = prevent_search(models.CharField(...))
 
     The flag set by this function is used by
-    `awx.api.filters.FieldLookupBackend` to blacklist fields and relations that
+    `awx.api.filters.FieldLookupBackend` to block fields and relations that
     should not be searchable/filterable via search query params
     """
     setattr(relation, '__prevent_search__', True)
diff --git a/awx/main/models/inventory.py b/awx/main/models/inventory.py
index ded7b71db2..137c056111 100644
--- a/awx/main/models/inventory.py
+++ b/awx/main/models/inventory.py
@@ -1910,7 +1910,7 @@ class ec2(PluginFileInjector):
         # Compatibility content
         legacy_regex = {
             True: r"[^A-Za-z0-9\_]",
-            False: r"[^A-Za-z0-9\_\-]"  # do not replace dash, dash is whitelisted
+            False: r"[^A-Za-z0-9\_\-]"  # do not replace dash, dash is allowed
         }[replace_dash]
         list_replacer = 'map("regex_replace", "{rx}", "_") | list'.format(rx=legacy_regex)
         # this option, a plugin option, will allow dashes, but not unicode
@@ -1943,7 +1943,7 @@ class ec2(PluginFileInjector):
             ret['boto_profile'] = source_vars['boto_profile']
 
         elif not replace_dash:
-            # Using the plugin, but still want dashes whitelisted
+            # Using the plugin, but still want dashes allowed
             ret['use_contrib_script_compatible_sanitization'] = True
 
         if source_vars.get('nested_groups') is False:
diff --git a/awx/main/models/notifications.py b/awx/main/models/notifications.py
index 99deadf3d6..de0432e312 100644
--- a/awx/main/models/notifications.py
+++ b/awx/main/models/notifications.py
@@ -262,25 +262,25 @@ class JobNotificationMixin(object):
                                'running': 'started',
                                'failed': 'error'}
     # Tree of fields that can be safely referenced in a notification message
-    JOB_FIELDS_WHITELIST = ['id', 'type', 'url', 'created', 'modified', 'name', 'description', 'job_type', 'playbook',
-                            'forks', 'limit', 'verbosity', 'job_tags', 'force_handlers', 'skip_tags', 'start_at_task',
-                            'timeout', 'use_fact_cache', 'launch_type', 'status', 'failed', 'started', 'finished',
-                            'elapsed', 'job_explanation', 'execution_node', 'controller_node', 'allow_simultaneous',
-                            'scm_revision', 'diff_mode', 'job_slice_number', 'job_slice_count', 'custom_virtualenv',
-                            'approval_status', 'approval_node_name', 'workflow_url', 'scm_branch',
-                            {'host_status_counts': ['skipped', 'ok', 'changed', 'failed', 'failures', 'dark'
-                                                    'processed', 'rescued', 'ignored']},
-                            {'summary_fields': [{'inventory': ['id', 'name', 'description', 'has_active_failures',
-                                                               'total_hosts', 'hosts_with_active_failures', 'total_groups',
-                                                               'has_inventory_sources',
-                                                               'total_inventory_sources', 'inventory_sources_with_failures',
-                                                               'organization_id', 'kind']},
-                                                {'project': ['id', 'name', 'description', 'status', 'scm_type']},
-                                                {'job_template': ['id', 'name', 'description']},
-                                                {'unified_job_template': ['id', 'name', 'description', 'unified_job_type']},
-                                                {'instance_group': ['name', 'id']},
-                                                {'created_by': ['id', 'username', 'first_name', 'last_name']},
-                                                {'labels': ['count', 'results']}]}]
+    JOB_FIELDS_ALLOWED_LIST = ['id', 'type', 'url', 'created', 'modified', 'name', 'description', 'job_type', 'playbook',
+                               'forks', 'limit', 'verbosity', 'job_tags', 'force_handlers', 'skip_tags', 'start_at_task',
+                               'timeout', 'use_fact_cache', 'launch_type', 'status', 'failed', 'started', 'finished',
+                               'elapsed', 'job_explanation', 'execution_node', 'controller_node', 'allow_simultaneous',
+                               'scm_revision', 'diff_mode', 'job_slice_number', 'job_slice_count', 'custom_virtualenv',
+                               'approval_status', 'approval_node_name', 'workflow_url', 'scm_branch',
+                               {'host_status_counts': ['skipped', 'ok', 'changed', 'failed', 'failures', 'dark'
+                                                       'processed', 'rescued', 'ignored']},
+                               {'summary_fields': [{'inventory': ['id', 'name', 'description', 'has_active_failures',
+                                                                  'total_hosts', 'hosts_with_active_failures', 'total_groups',
+                                                                  'has_inventory_sources',
+                                                                  'total_inventory_sources', 'inventory_sources_with_failures',
+                                                                  'organization_id', 'kind']},
+                                                   {'project': ['id', 'name', 'description', 'status', 'scm_type']},
+                                                   {'job_template': ['id', 'name', 'description']},
+                                                   {'unified_job_template': ['id', 'name', 'description', 'unified_job_type']},
+                                                   {'instance_group': ['name', 'id']},
+                                                   {'created_by': ['id', 'username', 'first_name', 'last_name']},
+                                                   {'labels': ['count', 'results']}]}]
 
     @classmethod
     def context_stub(cls):
@@ -377,8 +377,8 @@ class JobNotificationMixin(object):
 
     def context(self, serialized_job):
         """Returns a dictionary that can be used for rendering notification messages.
-        The context will contain whitelisted content retrieved from a serialized job object
-        (see JobNotificationMixin.JOB_FIELDS_WHITELIST), the job's friendly name,
+        The context will contain allowed content retrieved from a serialized job object
+        (see JobNotificationMixin.JOB_FIELDS_ALLOWED_LIST the job's friendly name,
         and a url to the job run."""
         job_context = {'host_status_counts': {}}
         summary = None
@@ -395,22 +395,22 @@ class JobNotificationMixin(object):
             'job_metadata': json.dumps(self.notification_data(), indent=4)
         }
 
-        def build_context(node, fields, whitelisted_fields):
-            for safe_field in whitelisted_fields:
+        def build_context(node, fields, allowed_fields):
+            for safe_field in allowed_fields:
                 if type(safe_field) is dict:
-                    field, whitelist_subnode = safe_field.copy().popitem()
+                    field, allowed_subnode = safe_field.copy().popitem()
                     # ensure content present in job serialization
                     if field not in fields:
                         continue
                     subnode = fields[field]
                     node[field] = {}
-                    build_context(node[field], subnode, whitelist_subnode)
+                    build_context(node[field], subnode, allowed_subnode)
                 else:
                     # ensure content present in job serialization
                     if safe_field not in fields:
                         continue
                     node[safe_field] = fields[safe_field]
-        build_context(context['job'], serialized_job, self.JOB_FIELDS_WHITELIST)
+        build_context(context['job'], serialized_job, self.JOB_FIELDS_ALLOWED_LIST)
 
         return context
 
diff --git a/awx/main/models/workflow.py b/awx/main/models/workflow.py
index 3990381623..aaf59b25b8 100644
--- a/awx/main/models/workflow.py
+++ b/awx/main/models/workflow.py
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ class WorkflowJobTemplateNode(WorkflowNodeBase):
         'always_nodes', 'credentials', 'inventory', 'extra_data', 'survey_passwords',
         'char_prompts', 'all_parents_must_converge', 'identifier'
     ]
-    REENCRYPTION_BLACKLIST_AT_COPY = ['extra_data', 'survey_passwords']
+    REENCRYPTION_BLOCKLIST_AT_COPY = ['extra_data', 'survey_passwords']
 
     workflow_job_template = models.ForeignKey(
         'WorkflowJobTemplate',
diff --git a/awx/main/tasks.py b/awx/main/tasks.py
index 7873ee4b84..a4aee391e7 100644
--- a/awx/main/tasks.py
+++ b/awx/main/tasks.py
@@ -1802,7 +1802,7 @@ class RunJob(BaseTask):
 
         # By default, all extra vars disallow Jinja2 template usage for
         # security reasons; top level key-values defined in JT.extra_vars, however,
-        # are whitelisted as "safe" (because they can only be set by users with
+        # are allowed as "safe" (because they can only be set by users with
         # higher levels of privilege - those that have the ability create and
         # edit Job Templates)
         safe_dict = {}
@@ -2472,7 +2472,7 @@ class RunInventoryUpdate(BaseTask):
 
         if inventory_update.source in ['scm', 'custom']:
             for env_k in inventory_update.source_vars_dict:
-                if str(env_k) not in env and str(env_k) not in settings.INV_ENV_VARIABLE_BLACKLIST:
+                if str(env_k) not in env and str(env_k) not in settings.INV_ENV_VARIABLE_BLOCKED:
                     env[str(env_k)] = str(inventory_update.source_vars_dict[env_k])
         elif inventory_update.source == 'file':
             raise NotImplementedError('Cannot update file sources through the task system.')
diff --git a/awx/main/tests/functional/api/test_generic.py b/awx/main/tests/functional/api/test_generic.py
index c6fe7ca188..2933cb09e6 100644
--- a/awx/main/tests/functional/api/test_generic.py
+++ b/awx/main/tests/functional/api/test_generic.py
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from awx.api.versioning import reverse
 
 
 @pytest.mark.django_db
-def test_proxy_ip_whitelist(get, patch, admin):
+def test_proxy_ip_allowed(get, patch, admin):
     url = reverse('api:setting_singleton_detail', kwargs={'category_slug': 'system'})
     patch(url, user=admin, data={
         'REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS': [
@@ -23,37 +23,37 @@ def test_proxy_ip_whitelist(get, patch, admin):
         def process_response(self, request, response):
             self.environ = request.environ
 
-    # By default, `PROXY_IP_WHITELIST` is disabled, so custom `REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS`
+    # By default, `PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST` is disabled, so custom `REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS`
     # should just pass through
     middleware = HeaderTrackingMiddleware()
     get(url, user=admin, middleware=middleware,
         HTTP_X_FROM_THE_LOAD_BALANCER='some-actual-ip')
     assert middleware.environ['HTTP_X_FROM_THE_LOAD_BALANCER'] == 'some-actual-ip'
 
-    # If `PROXY_IP_WHITELIST` is restricted to 10.0.1.100 and we make a request
+    # If `PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST` is restricted to 10.0.1.100 and we make a request
     # from 8.9.10.11, the custom `HTTP_X_FROM_THE_LOAD_BALANCER` header should
     # be stripped
     patch(url, user=admin, data={
-        'PROXY_IP_WHITELIST': ['10.0.1.100']
+        'PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST': ['10.0.1.100']
     })
     middleware = HeaderTrackingMiddleware()
     get(url, user=admin, middleware=middleware, REMOTE_ADDR='8.9.10.11',
         HTTP_X_FROM_THE_LOAD_BALANCER='some-actual-ip')
     assert 'HTTP_X_FROM_THE_LOAD_BALANCER' not in middleware.environ
 
-    # If 8.9.10.11 is added to `PROXY_IP_WHITELIST` the
+    # If 8.9.10.11 is added to `PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST` the
     # `HTTP_X_FROM_THE_LOAD_BALANCER` header should be passed through again
     patch(url, user=admin, data={
-        'PROXY_IP_WHITELIST': ['10.0.1.100', '8.9.10.11']
+        'PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST': ['10.0.1.100', '8.9.10.11']
     })
     middleware = HeaderTrackingMiddleware()
     get(url, user=admin, middleware=middleware, REMOTE_ADDR='8.9.10.11',
         HTTP_X_FROM_THE_LOAD_BALANCER='some-actual-ip')
     assert middleware.environ['HTTP_X_FROM_THE_LOAD_BALANCER'] == 'some-actual-ip'
 
-    # Allow whitelisting of proxy hostnames in addition to IP addresses
+    # Allow allowed list of proxy hostnames in addition to IP addresses
     patch(url, user=admin, data={
-        'PROXY_IP_WHITELIST': ['my.proxy.example.org']
+        'PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST': ['my.proxy.example.org']
     })
     middleware = HeaderTrackingMiddleware()
     get(url, user=admin, middleware=middleware, REMOTE_ADDR='8.9.10.11',
diff --git a/awx/main/tests/functional/api/test_inventory.py b/awx/main/tests/functional/api/test_inventory.py
index 7a25f7e1cd..59fa3b0aba 100644
--- a/awx/main/tests/functional/api/test_inventory.py
+++ b/awx/main/tests/functional/api/test_inventory.py
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ def test_inventory_update_access_called(post, inventory_source, alice, mock_acce
 @pytest.mark.django_db
 def test_inventory_source_vars_prohibition(post, inventory, admin_user):
     with mock.patch('awx.api.serializers.settings') as mock_settings:
-        mock_settings.INV_ENV_VARIABLE_BLACKLIST = ('FOOBAR',)
+        mock_settings.INV_ENV_VARIABLE_BLOCKED = ('FOOBAR',)
         r = post(reverse('api:inventory_source_list'),
                  {'name': 'new inv src', 'source_vars': '{\"FOOBAR\": \"val\"}', 'inventory': inventory.pk},
                  admin_user, expect=400)
diff --git a/awx/main/tests/unit/test_tasks.py b/awx/main/tests/unit/test_tasks.py
index b711e6dcb1..f8c8094ac0 100644
--- a/awx/main/tests/unit/test_tasks.py
+++ b/awx/main/tests/unit/test_tasks.py
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ class TestExtraVarSanitation(TestJobExecution):
         assert extra_vars['msg'] == {'a': [self.UNSAFE]}
         assert hasattr(extra_vars['msg']['a'][0], '__UNSAFE__')
 
-    def test_whitelisted_jt_extra_vars(self, job, private_data_dir):
+    def test_allowed_jt_extra_vars(self, job, private_data_dir):
         job.job_template.extra_vars = job.extra_vars = json.dumps({'msg': self.UNSAFE})
         task = tasks.RunJob()
 
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ class TestExtraVarSanitation(TestJobExecution):
         assert extra_vars['msg'] == self.UNSAFE
         assert not hasattr(extra_vars['msg'], '__UNSAFE__')
 
-    def test_nested_whitelisted_vars(self, job, private_data_dir):
+    def test_nested_allowed_vars(self, job, private_data_dir):
         job.extra_vars = json.dumps({'msg': {'a': {'b': [self.UNSAFE]}}})
         job.job_template.extra_vars = job.extra_vars
         task = tasks.RunJob()
diff --git a/awx/main/utils/common.py b/awx/main/utils/common.py
index d3e9d61f65..75fcd306ef 100644
--- a/awx/main/utils/common.py
+++ b/awx/main/utils/common.py
@@ -367,13 +367,13 @@ def get_allowed_fields(obj, serializer_mapping):
         'oauth2application': ['client_secret']
     }
     model_name = obj._meta.model_name
-    field_blacklist = ACTIVITY_STREAM_FIELD_EXCLUSIONS.get(model_name, [])
+    fields_excluded = ACTIVITY_STREAM_FIELD_EXCLUSIONS.get(model_name, [])
     # see definition of from_db for CredentialType
     # injection logic of any managed types are incompatible with activity stream
     if model_name == 'credentialtype' and obj.managed_by_tower and obj.namespace:
-        field_blacklist.extend(['inputs', 'injectors'])
-    if field_blacklist:
-        allowed_fields = [f for f in allowed_fields if f not in field_blacklist]
+        fields_excluded.extend(['inputs', 'injectors'])
+    if fields_excluded:
+        allowed_fields = [f for f in allowed_fields if f not in fields_excluded]
     return allowed_fields
 
 
diff --git a/awx/main/utils/filters.py b/awx/main/utils/filters.py
index 2edee2b66a..5a01599e86 100644
--- a/awx/main/utils/filters.py
+++ b/awx/main/utils/filters.py
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from django.apps import apps
 from django.db import models
 from django.conf import settings
 
-from awx.main.constants import LOGGER_BLACKLIST
+from awx.main.constants import LOGGER_BLOCKLIST
 from awx.main.utils.common import get_search_fields
 
 __all__ = ['SmartFilter', 'ExternalLoggerEnabled', 'DynamicLevelFilter']
@@ -48,11 +48,11 @@ class FieldFromSettings(object):
             instance.settings_override[self.setting_name] = value
 
 
-def record_is_blacklisted(record):
-    """Given a log record, return True if it is considered to be in
-    the logging blacklist, return False if not
+def record_is_blocked(record):
+    """Given a log record, return True if it is considered to be
+    blocked, return False if not
     """
-    for logger_name in LOGGER_BLACKLIST:
+    for logger_name in LOGGER_BLOCKLIST:
         if record.name.startswith(logger_name):
             return True
     return False
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ class ExternalLoggerEnabled(Filter):
         True - should be logged
         """
         # Do not send exceptions to external logger
-        if record_is_blacklisted(record):
+        if record_is_blocked(record):
             return False
         # General enablement
         if not self.enabled_flag:
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ class DynamicLevelFilter(Filter):
         """Filters out logs that have a level below the threshold defined
         by the databse setting LOG_AGGREGATOR_LEVEL
         """
-        if record_is_blacklisted(record):
-            # Fine to write blacklisted loggers to file, apply default filtering level
+        if record_is_blocked(record):
+            # Fine to write denied loggers to file, apply default filtering level
             cutoff_level = logging.WARNING
         else:
             try:
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ class SmartFilter(object):
               pyparsing do the heavy lifting.
         TODO: separate django filter requests from our custom json filter
               request so we don't process the key any. This could be
-              accomplished using a whitelist or introspecting the
+              accomplished using an allowed list or introspecting the
               relationship refered to to see if it's a jsonb type.
         '''
         def _json_path_to_contains(self, k, v):
diff --git a/awx/main/utils/safe_yaml.py b/awx/main/utils/safe_yaml.py
index 4147092ba8..7e4a5b1496 100644
--- a/awx/main/utils/safe_yaml.py
+++ b/awx/main/utils/safe_yaml.py
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ def safe_dump(x, safe_dict=None):
     _unless_ they've been deemed "trusted" (meaning, they likely were set/added
     by a user with a high level of privilege).
 
-    This function allows you to pass in a trusted `safe_dict` to whitelist 
+    This function allows you to pass in a trusted `safe_dict` to allow
     certain extra vars so that they are _not_ marked as `!unsafe` in the
     resulting YAML.  Anything _not_ in this dict will automatically be
     `!unsafe`.
diff --git a/awx/settings/defaults.py b/awx/settings/defaults.py
index d40c3e5a68..fe7c8c0ba3 100644
--- a/awx/settings/defaults.py
+++ b/awx/settings/defaults.py
@@ -163,13 +163,13 @@ ALLOWED_HOSTS = []
 REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS = ['REMOTE_ADDR', 'REMOTE_HOST']
 
 # If Tower is behind a reverse proxy/load balancer, use this setting to
-# whitelist the proxy IP addresses from which Tower should trust custom
+# allow the proxy IP addresses from which Tower should trust custom
 # REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS header values
 # REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS = ['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR', ''REMOTE_ADDR', 'REMOTE_HOST']
-# PROXY_IP_WHITELIST = ['10.0.1.100', '10.0.1.101']
+# PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST = ['10.0.1.100', '10.0.1.101']
 # If this setting is an empty list (the default), the headers specified by
 # REMOTE_HOST_HEADERS will be trusted unconditionally')
-PROXY_IP_WHITELIST = []
+PROXY_IP_ALLOWED_LIST = []
 
 CUSTOM_VENV_PATHS = []
 
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ AD_HOC_COMMANDS = [
     'win_user',
 ]
 
-INV_ENV_VARIABLE_BLACKLIST = ("HOME", "USER", "_", "TERM")
+INV_ENV_VARIABLE_BLOCKED = ("HOME", "USER", "_", "TERM")
 
 # ----------------
 # -- Amazon EC2 --
@@ -694,11 +694,6 @@ EC2_REGION_NAMES = {
     'cn-north-1': _('China (Beijing)'),
 }
 
-EC2_REGIONS_BLACKLIST = [
-    'us-gov-west-1',
-    'cn-north-1',
-]
-
 # Inventory variable name/values for determining if host is active/enabled.
 EC2_ENABLED_VAR = 'ec2_state'
 EC2_ENABLED_VALUE = 'running'
@@ -715,8 +710,6 @@ EC2_EXCLUDE_EMPTY_GROUPS = True
 # ------------
 # -- VMware --
 # ------------
-VMWARE_REGIONS_BLACKLIST = []
-
 # Inventory variable name/values for determining whether a host is
 # active in vSphere.
 VMWARE_ENABLED_VAR = 'guest.gueststate'
@@ -771,8 +764,6 @@ GCE_REGION_CHOICES = [
     ('australia-southeast1-b', _('Australia Southeast (B)')),
     ('australia-southeast1-c', _('Australia Southeast (C)')),
 ]
-GCE_REGIONS_BLACKLIST = []
-
 # Inventory variable name/value for determining whether a host is active
 # in Google Compute Engine.
 GCE_ENABLED_VAR = 'status'
@@ -817,8 +808,6 @@ AZURE_RM_REGION_CHOICES = [
     ('koreacentral', _('Korea Central')),
     ('koreasouth', _('Korea South')),
 ]
-AZURE_RM_REGIONS_BLACKLIST = []
-
 AZURE_RM_GROUP_FILTER = r'^.+$'
 AZURE_RM_HOST_FILTER = r'^.+$'
 AZURE_RM_ENABLED_VAR = 'powerstate'
diff --git a/awx/settings/development.py b/awx/settings/development.py
index 2b6e1162a8..3a4e008488 100644
--- a/awx/settings/development.py
+++ b/awx/settings/development.py
@@ -183,5 +183,4 @@ else:
     except Exception:
         pass
 
-WEBSOCKET_ORIGIN_WHITELIST = ['https://localhost:8043', 'https://localhost:3000']
 AWX_CALLBACK_PROFILE = True
diff --git a/docs/debugging.md b/docs/debugging.md
index 9b289f0697..62a59d5317 100644
--- a/docs/debugging.md
+++ b/docs/debugging.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ This IP address can be found by making a GET to any page on the browsable API an
 awx_1        | 14:42:08 uwsgi.1     | 172.18.0.1 GET /api/v2/tokens/ - HTTP/1.1 200
 ```
 
-Whitelist this IP address by adding it to the `INTERNAL_IPS` variable in `local_settings`, then navigate to the API and you should see DDT on the
+Allow this IP address by adding it to the `INTERNAL_IPS` variable in `local_settings`, then navigate to the API and you should see DDT on the
 right side.  If you don't see it, make sure to set `DEBUG=True`.  
 > Note that enabling DDT is detrimental to the performance of AWX and adds overhead to every API request.  It is
 recommended to keep this turned off when you are not using it.  
diff --git a/docs/prompting.md b/docs/prompting.md
index 5f2d998022..4ce22bc6b4 100644
--- a/docs/prompting.md
+++ b/docs/prompting.md
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ The standard pattern applies to the following fields:
  - `ask_inventory_on_launch` allows use of `inventory`
 
 Surveys are a special-case of prompting for variables - applying a survey to
-a template whitelists variable names in the survey spec (requires the survey
+a template allows variable names in the survey spec (requires the survey
 spec to exist and `survey_enabled` to be true). On the other hand,
 if `ask_variables_on_launch` is true, users can provide any variables in
 `extra_vars`.
diff --git a/docs/resource_copy.md b/docs/resource_copy.md
index f9b87234b0..b63c8917fe 100644
--- a/docs/resource_copy.md
+++ b/docs/resource_copy.md
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ user performing the copy, and `new_objs`, a list of all sub objects of the creat
 `user`'s permission against these new sub objects and unlink related objects or send
 warning logs as necessary. `deep_copy_permission_check_func` should not return anything.
 
-Lastly, macro `REENCRYPTION_BLACKLIST_AT_COPY` is available as part of a model definition. It is a
+Lastly, macro `REENCRYPTION_BLOCKLIST_AT_COPY` is available as part of a model definition. It is a
 list of field names which will escape re-encryption during copy. For example, the `extra_data` field
 of workflow job template nodes.