prelim update to docs

This commit is contained in:
adamscmRH 2018-02-23 12:42:44 -05:00
parent 2911dec324
commit 87350e1014
5 changed files with 126 additions and 21 deletions

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@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ class LoggedOAuth2Authentication(OAuth2Authentication):
user, token = ret
username = user.username if user else '<none>'
logger.debug(smart_text(
u"User {} performed a {} to {} through the API using OAuth token {}".format(
username, request.method, request.path, user
u"User {} performed a {} to {} through the API using OAuth token {}.".format(
username, request.method, request.path, token.pk
)
))
setattr(user, 'oauth_scopes', [x for x in token.scope.split() if x])

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@ -128,8 +128,6 @@ Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15768000
{"access_token": "9epHOqHhnXUcgYK8QanOmUQPSgX92g", "token_type": "Bearer", "expires_in": 36000, "refresh_token": "jMRX6QvzOTf046KHee3TU5mT3nyXsz", "scope": "read"}
```
## Verify by introspecting the access token:
>> Need to fill in Introspection Example in the docs here #TODO: Add Introspection
## Refresh an existing access token
Suppose we have an existing access token with refresh token provided:
@ -146,7 +144,7 @@ Suppose we have an existing access token with refresh token provided:
"scope": "read write"
}
```
`/api/o/token/` endpoint is used for refreshing access token:
The `/api/o/token/` endpoint is used for refreshing access token:
```bash
curl -X POST \
-d "grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=AL0NK9TTpv0qp54dGbC4VUZtsZ9r8z" \

View File

@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ from awx.api.views import (
UserAccessList,
OAuth2ApplicationList,
OAuth2TokenList,
OAuth2AuthorizedTokenList,
OAuth2PersonalTokenList,
UserAuthorizedTokenList,
)

View File

@ -86,3 +86,113 @@ token scope; or POSTing to `/api/applications/<pk>/tokens/` by providing only `s
the parent application will be automatically linked.
# More Docs Coming Soon
Note a default new application will be created for each new user. So each new user is supposed to see
at least one application available to them.
Tokens, on the other hand, are resources used to actually authenticate incoming requests and mask the
permissions of underlying user. Tokens can be created by POSTing to `/api/v2/tokens/`
endpoint by providing `application` and `scope` fields to point to related application and specify
token scope; or POSTing to `/api/applications/<pk>/tokens/` by providing only `scope`, while
the parent application will be automatically linked.
Individual tokens will be accessible via their primary keys:
`/api/<version>/me/oauth/tokens/<primary key of a token>/`. Here is a typical token:
```
{
"id": 17,
"type": "access_token",
"url": "/api/v2/me/oauth/tokens/17/",
"related": {
"user": "/api/v2/users/1/",
"application": "/api/v2/me/oauth/applications/4/",
"activity_stream": "/api/v2/me/oauth/tokens/17/activity_stream/"
},
"summary_fields": {
"application": {
"id": 4,
"name": "admin's token",
"client_id": "D6SwhKbfp2LuUjkmiUpMMYFyNqhpv5PTVci7eXTT"
},
"user": {
"id": 1,
"username": "admin",
"first_name": "",
"last_name": ""
}
},
"created": "2017-12-12T16:48:10.489550Z",
"modified": "2017-12-12T16:48:10.522189Z",
"user": 1,
"token": "kqHqxfpHGRRBXLNCOXxT5Zt3tpJogn",
"refresh_token": "miZq3hqSugvYxhzdQYJIBDgIHxJPnT",
"application": 4,
"expires": "2017-12-13T02:48:10.488180Z",
"scope": "read"
}
```
For an OAuth token, the only fully mutable field is `scope`. The `application` field is *immutable
on update*, and all other fields are totally immutable, and will be auto-populated during creation:
`user` field will be the `user` field of related application; `expires` will be generated according
to Tower configuration setting `OAUTH2_PROVIDER`; `token` and `refresh_token` will be auto-generated
to be non-crashing random strings.
On RBAC side:
- A user will be able to create a token if they are able to see the related application;
- System admin is able to see and manipulate every token in the system;
- Organization admins will be able to see and manipulate all tokens belonging to Organization
members;
- Other normal users will only be able to see and manipulate their own tokens.
> Note: Users can only see the token or refresh-token _value_ at the time of creation ONLY.
#### Using OAuth 2 token system as a Personal Access Token (PAT)
The most common usage of OAuth 2 is authenticating users. The `token` field of a token is used
as part of the HTTP authentication header, in the format `Authorization: Bearer <token field value>`. This _Bearer_
token can be obtained by doing a curl to the `/api/o/token/` endpoint as shown in `api_o_auth_authorization_root_view.md`.
Here is an example of using that PAT to access an API endpoint using `curl`:
```
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer kqHqxfpHGRRBXLNCOXxT5Zt3tpJogn" http://localhost:8013/api/v2/credentials/
```
According to OAuth 2 specification, users should be able to acquire, revoke and refresh an access
token. In AWX the equivalent, and the easiest, way of doing that is creating a token, deleting
a token, and deleting a token quickly followed by creating a new one.
On the other hand, the specification also provides standard ways of doing those. RFC 6749 elaborates
on those topics, but in summary, an OAuth token is officially acquired via authorization using
authorization information provided by applications (special application fields mentioned above).
There are dedicated endpoints for authorization and acquiring tokens. The token acquire endpoint
is also responsible for token refresh, and token revoke is done by a dedicated token revoke endpoint.
In AWX, our OAuth system is built on top of
[Django Oauth Toolkit](https://django-oauth-toolkit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/), which provides full
support on standard authorization, token revoke and refresh. AWX implements them and puts related
endpoints under `/api/o/` endpoint. Detailed examples on the most typical usage of those endpoints
are available as description text of `/api/o/`.
#### Token scope mask over RBAC system
The scope of an OAuth token is a space-separated string composed of keywords like 'read' and 'write'.
These keywords are configurable and used to specify permission level of the authenticated API client.
For the initial OAuth implementation, we use the most simple scope configuration, where the only
valid scope keywords are 'read' and 'write'.
Read and write scopes provide a mask layer over the RBAC permission system of AWX. In specific, a
'write' scope gives the authenticated user full permissions the RBAC system provides, while 'read'
scope gives the authenticated user only read permissions the RBAC system provides.
For example, if a user has admin permission to a job template, she can both see and modify, launch
and delete the job template if authenticated via session or basic auth. On the other hand, if she
is authenticated using OAuth token, and the related token scope is 'read', she can only see but
not manipulate or launch the job template, despite she has admin role over it; if the token scope is
'write' or 'read write', she can take full advantage of the job template as its admin.
## Acceptance Criteria
* All CRUD operations for OAuth applications and tokens should function as described.
* RBAC rules applied to OAuth applications and tokens should behave as described.
* A default application should be auto-created for each new user.
* Incoming requests using unexpired OAuth token correctly in authentication header should be able
to successfully authenticate themselves.
* Token scope mask over RBAC should work as described.
* Tower configuration setting `OAUTH2_PROVIDER` should be configurable and function as described.
* `/api/o/` endpoint should work as expected. In specific, all examples given in the description
help text should be working (user following the steps should get expected result).

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@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
## Introduction
>> Updated to these docs coming soon.
Before Tower 3.3, auth token is used as the main authentication method. Starting from Tower 3.3,
session-based authentication will take the place as the main authentication, while auth token
will be replaced by OAuth tokens also introduced in 3.3.
Before Tower 3.3, auth token was used as the main authentication method. Starting from Tower 3.3,
session-based authentication will take the place as the main authentication method, and auth token
will be replaced by OAuth 2 tokens.
Session authentication is a safer way of utilizing HTTP(S) cookies:
@ -11,19 +10,19 @@ Theoretically, user can provide authentication information, like username and pa
`Cookie` header, but this method is vulnerable to cookie hijacks, where crackers can see and steal user
information from cookie payload.
Session authentication, on the other hand, sets a single `sessionid` cookie, called 'session'. Session
Session authentication, on the other hand, sets a single `session_id` cookie. The session_id
is *a random string which will be mapped to user authentication informations by server*. Crackers who
hijacks cookie will only get session itself, which does not imply any critical user info, valid only for
hijacks cookie will only get the session_id itself, which does not imply any critical user info, is valid only for
a limited time, and can be revoked at any time.
## Usage
In session authentication, user log in using endpoint `/api/login/`. GET to `/api/login/` displays the
In session authentication, users log in using the `/api/login/` endpoint. A GET to `/api/login/` displays the
log in page of API browser:
![Example session log in page](../img/auth_session_1.png?raw=true)
User should enter correct username and password before clicking on 'LOG IN' button, which fires a POST
Users should enter correct username and password before clicking on 'LOG IN' button, which fires a POST
to `/api/login/` to actually log the user in. The return code of a successful login is 302, meaning upon
successful login, the browser will be redirected, the redirected destination is determined by `next` form
item described below.
@ -35,7 +34,7 @@ be provided in the form:
* `next`: The path of the redirect destination, in API browser `"/api/"` is used.
* `csrfmiddlewaretoken`: The CSRF token, usually populated by using Django template `{% csrf_token %}`.
Session is provided as a return `Set-Cookie` header. Here is a typical one:
The session_id is provided as a return `Set-Cookie` header. Here is a typical one:
```
Set-Cookie: sessionid=lwan8l5ynhrqvps280rg5upp7n3yp6ds; expires=Tue, 21-Nov-2017 16:33:13 GMT; httponly; Max-Age=1209600; Path=/
```
@ -45,10 +44,10 @@ session cookie value, expiration date, duration, etc.
The duration of the cookie is configurable by Tower Configuration setting `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` under
category `authentication`. It is an integer denoting the number of seconds the session cookie should
live.
live. The default session cookie age is 2 weeks.
After a valid session is acquired, a client should provide session as a cookie for subsequent requests
in order to be authenticated. like
After a valid session is acquired, a client should provide the session_id as a cookie for subsequent requests
in order to be authenticated. For example:
```
Cookie: sessionid=lwan8l5ynhrqvps280rg5upp7n3yp6ds; ...
```
@ -63,8 +62,7 @@ by performing session acquire with the session provided.
A Tower configuration setting, `SESSIONS_PER_USER` under category `authentication`, is used to set the
maximum number of valid sessions a user can have at the same time. For example, if `SESSIONS_PER_USER`
is set to 3, while the same user is logged in via 5 different places, and thus have 5 valid sessions
available at the same time, the earliest 2 (5 - 3) sessions created will be invalidated. Tower will try
is set to 3 and the same user is logged in from 5 different places, the earliest 2 sessions created will be invalidated. Tower will try
broadcasting, via websocket, to all available clients. The websocket message body will contain a list of
invalidated sessions. If a client finds its session in that list, it should try logging out.
@ -79,7 +77,7 @@ is updated, all sessions she owned will be invalidated and deleted.
* The maximum number of concurrent login for one user should be configurable by `SESSIONS_PER_USER`,
and over-limit user sessions should be warned by websocket.
* When a user's password is changed, all her sessions should be invalidated and deleted.
* User should not be able to authenticate either HTTPS(S) request or websocket connect using invalid
* User should not be able to authenticate by HTTPS(S) request nor websocket connect using invalid
sessions.
* No existing behavior, like job run, inventory update or callback receiver, should be affected
by session auth.